Fordham Law Review
Volume 80

Issue 3

Article 10

December 2011

Slicing Through the Great Legal Gordian Knot: Ways to Assist Pro
Se Litigants in Their Quest for Justice
Shon R. Hopwood

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Shon R. Hopwood, Slicing Through the Great Legal Gordian Knot: Ways to Assist Pro Se Litigants in Their
Quest for Justice, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1229 (2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss3/10

This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

SLICING THROUGH THE GREAT LEGAL
GORDIAN KNOT: WAYS TO ASSIST PRO SE
LITIGANTS IN THEIR QUEST FOR JUSTICE
Shon R. Hopwood*
In Greek mythology, the Gordian Knot was a large intertwined rope that
was impossible to untie. The knot was the work of Gordius, a king in what
is now Turkey. Legend has it that King Gordius fastened his chariot to a
pole using the Gordian Knot. Then Alexander the Great arrived and
attempted to unravel it. Anyone who has ever tried to unpack the box of
last year’s Christmas lights can appreciate what Alexander was up against.
He tried, unsuccessfully, and became frustrated at his inability to undo what
could not be undone. So he finally opened the Gordian Knot by cutting
through it with his sword. Alexander’s solution to the problem led to the
idiom “cutting the Gordian Knot,” which simply means solving a
complicated problem through bold action. 1
The problems facing pro se litigants are as daunting as the famed
Gordian Knot. Imagine trying to unravel the law without knowing where
the ends of the knot begin. Or for that matter, imagine trying to plead your
case without the benefit of a legal education. This was the quandary that
confronted me.
From 1998 to 2008, I was incarcerated in a federal prison—the result of
five bank robberies I committed as a foolish young adult. While in prison, I
was fortunate to receive a job in the prison law library. There, I sat reading
novels until June of 2000, when the Supreme Court handed down Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 2 a case calling into question the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines). Although at the time I could not have named a right in the
Bill of Rights, I began the process of learning the law through self-study so
that I could challenge my sentence. It ended badly. I filed a post* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law (Gates Scholar), 2014. In 1998,
Mr. Hopwood was sentenced to serve twelve years and three months in federal prison for his
role in five armed bank robberies. While in prison, he studied law and began preparing
briefs for other prisoners. He prepared two petitions for writs of certiorari that were granted
by the U.S. Supreme Court, and a host of successful direct appeals, post-conviction motions,
and habeas corpus petitions. In 2008, Hopwood was released from prison and became a
consultant for Cockle Law Brief Printing Company, where he advised numerous attorneys
on Supreme Court practice. He also created The CockleBur (http://www.thecocklebur.com),
a legal blog. In 2012, Crown/Random House will publish his memoir, entitled Law Man:
My Story of Robbing Banks, Winning Supreme Court Cases, and Finding Redemption.
1. See generally ARRIAN, THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER 104–06 (Aubrey De
Sélincourt trans., Penguin Books rev. & enlarged ed. 1971).
2. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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conviction motion with the Eighth Circuit only to learn that I had filed the
motion with the wrong court. Once it was in the hands of the right court, it
was unceremoniously denied.
But the result did not discourage me, and I went on to write postconviction motions and appeals briefs for other prisoners over an eight-year
span. While I did have some success, this is definitely not the norm.
I witnessed firsthand the difficulties that pro se litigants face both while I
was in prison and later at Cockle Law Brief Printing Company—one of the
largest U.S. Supreme Court brief printers in the country and the only printer
I am aware of that assists pro se litigants filing petitions for certiorari. Brief
printing is kind of a misnomer at Cockle, because that is the easy part. At
Cockle, my primary job is to consult with attorneys and pro se parties on
everything from filing requirements to how to phrase the Question
Presented in a manner to attract the Court’s interest. Before the briefs are
ready to print, we often consult and sometimes plead with parties to make
stylistic and substantive changes to their briefs.
Dealing with pro se litigants is not easy. When a brief comes into
Cockle, the office manager sets the documents on a counter where one of
the staff will snatch it up to start the process. When a pro se brief is placed
on the counter, more often than not, it lingers longer than an attorneyprepared brief. To be sure, someone will eventually take it, but nobody
really wants to; they are twice, often four times, more work than a normal
brief.
I bet avoiding pro se briefs is a common occurrence among clerks in
courts across the country. I recently read a legal blog post discussing a
particularly poor circuit brief written by an attorney. In the comment area,
someone said that while the brief was awful, it was better than the ones he
had read in his three years as a pro se clerk. The next comment was telling
on the state of pro se litigation. The comment said: “They should award
purple hearts for suffering through that.” 3
The increase in pro se litigation during these difficult economic times is
well documented, 4 as are the problems facing pro se litigants. 5 People
3. Cornellian, Comment to Lousy Legal Writing, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 7, 2011,
12:01 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/01/07/lousy-legal-writing/.
4. See ABA COALITION FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE IMPACT
OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS (PRELIMINARY) 3, 5
(2010), available at http://www.abajournal.com/files/Coalition_for_Justice_Report_
on_Survey.pdf (survey of approximately 1,200 state trial judges noted that 60 percent of
judges saw an increase in the number of unrepresented parties in 2009); ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.2.4 (2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/statistics/judicialfactsandfigures/2008/alljudicialfactsfigur
es.pdf.
5. See generally Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem of
Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573 (2002); Thomas C.
O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299 (2006); Nina
Ingwer VanWormer, Help at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro
Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983 (2007); RICHARD MOORHEAD & MARK SEFTON,
DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, LITIGANTS IN PERSON: UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN
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filing pro se must try to untie the tangled rope of procedure, rules, and
precedent on their own. The result is often a morass of indecipherable legal
pleadings, forfeiture of basic rights, and clogging of court dockets. Thomas
O’Bryant, a prisoner serving a life sentence in Florida, described the
obstacles confronting him as a pro se prisoner:
I had to engage in two extremely difficult tasks: I had to teach myself the
law, and I had to represent myself. I had to perform these tasks using
only the limited resources available to me inside the prison walls and
while trying to adjust to prison life, overcome mental health issues, such
as severe depression, and fight a drug addiction. 6

Rather than providing some overarching solution for the myriad
problems faced by pro se litigants (because no one-size-fits-all solution
exists and I am not that smart), I will discuss three specific difficulties I
have witnessed and how these problems could be rectified. The first
problem involves federal prisoners filing post-conviction motions; the
second involves pro se prisoners filing civil rights actions; and the third
involves pro se civil litigants filing an appeal. Although the impediments
associated with pro se litigation are overwhelming, they can be reduced
through targeted legislation, court action, and the assistance of the bar.
In 1995, Timothy McVeigh committed a heinous act of terrorism. While
tragic, the government’s response—as is usually the case when it acts in the
moment—was to pass legislation that was almost equally as tragic. On
April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 7 (AEDPA). Among other things, the Act
established a one-year limitation for federal defendants wishing to
collaterally attack their conviction or sentence through a motion under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. That one-year period runs from when the judgment
becomes final, which could be as quick as ten days after sentencing, or after
the direct appeal is completed. 8
In signing AEDPA, President Clinton hailed it as a way for the United
States to remain “in the forefront of the international effort to fight
terrorism through tougher laws and resolute enforcement.” 9 In describing
the changes to prisoners’ ability to avail themselves of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President stated: “First, I have long sought to streamline
Federal appeals for convicted criminals sentenced to the death penalty. For

FIRST INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS 153–80 (2005), available at http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/
research/pubs/repository/1221.pdf (discussing various issues facing pro se litigants in
English courts).
6. O’Bryant, supra note 5, at 300.
7. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (2006 & Supp. I 2007); see also Clay v. United States,
537 U.S. 522 (2003).
9. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 630, 631 (Apr. 24, 1996), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=52713.
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too long, and in too many cases, endless death row appeals have stood in
the way of justice being served.” 10
While President Clinton may have thought the goal of the Act was to
confront terrorism and reduce the amount of time death row inmates have to
challenge their convictions and sentences, the actual statute had a far
broader sweep than was needed to accomplish those goals. As I noted,
AEDPA bars all federal prisoners from filing post-conviction motions
challenging their case unless those prisoners file the motion within one year
of sentencing or direct appeal.
To the casual observer, that seems like a reasonable procedure. After all,
federal defendants do receive an attorney for a direct appeal to an appellate
court, so every conviction and sentence has the possibility of review. Thus,
why would prisoners need another appeal? Even if they did, it seems
reasonable to require them to file it within a reasonable amount of time.
But those arguments assume that appellate review ferrets out every case
where a legal error or a miscarriage of justice has occurred. 11 Worse yet,
such an argument assumes that lawyers are infallible, because only claims
raised at the trial court level and subsequently appealed are subject to
review. If the trial attorney commits a grave error, and she is the same
counsel on appeal, how likely is it that she will find and raise her own error
before the appellate court? It is not.
For this reason, we have post-conviction motions that are used primarily
to challenge attorney acts or omissions amounting to ineffective assistance
of counsel. 12 While I was in prison, post-conviction motions under § 2255
were the principal way that prisoners would challenge everything from
attorney sentencing error to counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of
appeal. 13
The writ of habeas corpus, under which § 2255 motions fall, is not some
extravagant, ill-advised method for prisoners to receive another bite at the
apple. Rather, it is a sacred right secured in the body of the Constitution, a
right that the “Framers viewed . . . as a fundamental precept of liberty” and
a “vital instrument to secure . . . freedom.” 14 Although the Framers thought
that habeas corpus was a necessary component to a free society, subsequent
Congresses have not shared that sentiment. 15
10. Id.
11. See Brendan Lowe, Will Georgia Kill an Innocent Man?, TIME (July 13, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1643384,00.html (discussing the appellate
obstacles that AEDPA created for death row inmate Troy Davis). Georgia executed Troy
Davis on September 21, 2011. See Cameron McWhirter, Georgia Prisoner Is Put to Death,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119037036
04576584551697538170.html.
12. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
13. For an excellent description of the unfairness wrought by AEDPA on postconviction remedies, see Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and
Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339
(2006).
14. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008).
15. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600,
2635–36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
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AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations places significant hurdles in
front of federal prisoners who are ill-equipped to meet the Act’s deadline.
These hurdles were on full display in the case of Melvin Brown. 16 Melvin
was a gentle twenty-four year old from Chicago, whom I met at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Pekin, Illinois. Melvin had been charged with
possession with intent to distribute six grams of cocaine base.17 The
evidence against Melvin was overwhelming and based upon his attorney’s
sound advice, he pled guilty. His sentencing occurred in 2003, before the
big Blakely and Booker cases threw federal sentencing into chaos by
making the Guidelines ranges discretionary. 18
Melvin came from poverty, and his criminal record reflected it. He had
been charged with petty theft and distributing small amounts of narcotics,
including one conviction in Illinois for what the state information said was
possession with intent to distribute 0.1 grams of crack. Since Melvin had
been convicted of a serious “controlled substance offense” and had two
previous controlled substance offenses, he was subject to the Guidelines’
career offender provision. 19 That provision boosted his sentence from a
Guidelines range of approximately five to seven years to a range of sixteen
to eighteen years. He was sentenced to fifteen years and eight months.20
Ten days later, Melvin’s conviction became final, because Melvin’s
attorney believed there were no meritorious grounds for appeal. Three
months later, Melvin was still awaiting his final destination to a federal
prison. By the time Melvin arrived in Pekin, the AEDPA clock had clicked
down to seven months. Melvin, with his ninth grade education, was
required to learn the law, find the legal errors in his case, draft a lucid
§ 2255 motion, and have it prepared in seven months.
This set of circumstances was not an anomaly: every week a bus would
arrive at Pekin with new uneducated prisoners. Most had no attorney to
prepare a post-conviction motion because whatever funds they and their
family did possess had already been poured into trial and appeal. These
legal novices were expected to learn the law and learn how to write within a
year; otherwise, they would forever forfeit the ability to challenge their
conviction or sentence.
Melvin knocked on my cell door about two-and-a-half weeks before his
§ 2255 motion was due. In his hands was a stack of disheveled papers. He
asked if I could take a look at his paperwork to see if he had an avenue to
attack his sentence.
I went through Melvin’s papers, which included documents from his
prior state convictions, the ones used to increase his sentence under the
career offender provision. I found the Illinois conviction for which Melvin
16. See Brown v. United States, No. 2:04-cv-00073 (W.D. Mich. July 12, 2004),
PACER No. 8.
17. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006).
18. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004).
19. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2010).
20. See Brown, No. 2:04-cv-00073, at 1.
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was originally charged with possession of 0.1 grams of crack with intent to
distribute. That charge had led to a plea to the reduced charge of simple
possession, meaning it was not a distribution charge. 21 This was a
meaningful distinction under the Guidelines and meant that Melvin did not
have the requisite number of prior convictions: the career criminal
provision did not apply. 22
We filed the motion and the District Court Judge first ordered the
probation officer, who prepared the Presentence Investigation Report, to
respond. The officer, to his credit, candidly admitted the mistake. The
Government agreed. Melvin was sentenced to a little over five years.
These types of stories are legion in federal prisons. They illustrate that as
long as fallible lawyers, probation officers, and judges exist, we need
meaningful post-conviction avenues for federal prisons. The current postconviction statute, as amended by AEDPA, restricts prisoners’ abilities to
file a coherent motion, and therefore, the statute prevents federal prisoners
from having a meaningful opportunity to challenge their convictions and
sentences.
So what is the solution to this problem? Given our current financial
outlook, I doubt Congress would spring for prisoner legal education. The
easiest solution would simply be for Congress to remove the one-year
statute of limitations for non-capital federal offenders. Why just noncapital offenses? For one, the political climate surrounding the death
penalty is always icy and by keeping the one-year requirement for capital
offenses, legislators would both avoid politicizing the amendment to
AEDPA and serve the original purpose of the Act. Moreover, while I have
qualms about the federal death penalty, the one-year requirement for postconviction matters does not concern me; under current federal law, a federal
capital defendant must be appointed two attorneys to represent her
throughout post-conviction proceedings. 23 To put it differently, the statute
of limitations provision does not require indigent, uneducated prisoners on
death row to learn the law and present their claims pro se.
Also, if the one-year statute of limitations were removed, prisoners
would not feel compelled to file frivolous motions under time constraints.
Many would prefer to wait and file when new decisions are handed down
that may affect their case, but the one-year limit forces them to file before
they are ready.
The next item I would like to discuss is one of the most vexing problems
facing prisoners: a lack of health care. Due to prison overcrowding and

21. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).
22. See id. §§ 4B1.1(a), 4B1.2(c).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2006) (“In any post conviction proceeding under section
2254 or 2255 of title 28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence,
any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or
investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the
appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in accordance
with subsections (b) through (f).”).
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budget constraints, prisoners are often denied treatment altogether.24 Even
when treatment is provided, it is sometimes delayed by weeks, months, or
years. This was a particular problem in the prison where I was housed.
I had a sixty-year-old friend named John Davis. One day John was
standing on a plastic chair so he could reach the pen lying on the top of his
bunk bed. The chair leg broke and John was sent plummeting to the floor.
John fractured his wrist in two places. After waiting several hours at the
prison medical facility, John was taken to an orthopedic surgeon who reset
the bones and placed John’s wrist in a half-cast. John and the prison
medical staff were instructed to re-examine and x-ray John’s wrist a week
later. Conducting a new x-ray within a week was vital, the surgeon said,
because if the bones had aligned improperly the surgeon would need to realign John’s wrist before the bone fused together during the healing
process.
The next week, John waited for his name to be called for an appointment
at the prison medical facility. It never was. John tried to discuss the
problem with the prison medical administrator, who told him that he would
be placed in segregation if he did not return to his housing unit. The x-ray
was never conducted and when John visited the surgeon a month later, the
surgeon was furious because his order had been disobeyed. The bones in
John’s wrist had healed improperly, leaving John with significant lost
functionality of his wrist.
John sued the prison medical staff for deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment. He survived a motion
to dismiss and discovery began. When he contacted the outside surgeon, he
received no response. Later, when the prison filed a motion for summary
judgment, the surgeon—who had a long-running contract with the prison—
had changed his story, now claiming that the x-ray would have made no
difference.
I had my sister conduct research online, which indicated that the prison’s
delay in x-raying John’s wrist could have contributed to the improper
healing and loss of function. But under circuit precedent, that was not
enough. 25 John was required to show, through verifying medical evidence,
that the delay in treatment caused harm. We tried to contact medical
experts but no one would respond, so we filed a motion to conduct a
deposition with the surgeon who had treated John and a surgeon who did
not possess a contract with the prison.
Since John made only twenty cents an hour at his prison job, he was
unable to afford the witness, transcription, and subpoena fees required to
perform a deposition. We argued that the in forma pauperis (IFP) statute
24. Joel H. Thompson, Today’s Deliberate Indifference: Providing Attention Without
Providing Treatment to Prisoners with Serious Medical Needs, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
635, 641–48 (2010).
25. See Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an inmate
alleging deliberate indifference delay in medical care “must place verifying medical evidence
in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay” or risk dismissal of his suit (quoting
Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1995))).
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allowed the court to waive the deposition fees for indigent litigants who
have no other way to obtain the verifying medical evidence required to
succeed on a deliberate indifference claim. That argument was rejected
with little discussion by the District Court and the Seventh Circuit on
appeal. 26
In my experience, the difficulty indigent prisoners have in obtaining
evidence to support their deliberate indifference claims is significant. How
can any prisoner expect to succeed in proving, through verifying medical
evidence, that the delay in their treatment caused medical harm without
access to doctors and medical specialists? If prisoners have no ability to
obtain the evidence necessary to prove their claims, it follows that they
cannot remedy a violation of their constitutional rights. In effect, the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is nothing
more than dead words on paper—a pleasant ideal that is never enforceable.
What is most unfortunate is that, in 1892, Congress provided indigent
litigants with a way to obtain depositions sans fees. In fact, the IFP statute
specifically addresses this issue. That statute states that “officers of the
court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases”
and “[w]itnesses shall attend as in other cases.”27 Unfortunately, this
language was read right out of the statute by federal courts of appeals in the
1980s and early 90s, 28 due to concerns that the statute would create a waste
of resources by frivolous prisoner suits. Those opinions conflict with a later
Supreme Court decision, 29 confuse the history of the IFP statute, 30 and are
based upon policy concerns that have largely been ameliorated with the
passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 31 For these reasons, I
have argued that courts should reconsider how they construe the IFP
statute. 32
One small note: even if my construction of the IFP statute does prevail,
it would not result in a waste of resources for overburdened courts. The
Prison Litigation Reform Act allows district courts to dismiss frivolous
suits before the discovery stage or at any other time if they feel that the
claim is frivolous. In addition, most indigent prisoner suits do not require
26. Davis v. Samalio, 286 F. App’x 325 (7th Cir. 2008).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (2006).
28. A consensus of circuits holds that § 1915 does not authorize courts to waive indigent
litigants’ witness fees in civil actions. See Pedraza v. Jones, 71 F.3d 194, 196–97 (5th Cir.
1995); Malik v. Lavalley, 994 F.2d 90, 90 (2d Cir. 1993); Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210,
211–12 (9th Cir. 1989); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987); McNeil v.
Lowney, 831 F.2d 1368, 1373 (7th Cir. 1987); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1986); U.S. Marshals Serv. v. Means, 741 F.2d 1053, 1057 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc);
Johnson v. Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 289–90 (6th Cir. 1983).
29. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307–08 (1989) (holding that courts
may request pro bono counsel to represent indigent litigants).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
31. Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18,
28, and 42 U.S.C.).
32. See generally Shon R. Hopwood, A Sunny Deposition: How the In Forma Pauperis
Statute Provides an Avenue for Indigent Prisoners to Seek Depositions Without
Accompanying Fees, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 195 (2011).
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outside medical evidence in order to succeed. The only result of the
construction I propose is that indigent litigants with arguably meritorious
claims would have the ability to conduct a deposition without fees in cases
where there is no other means for obtaining the relevant evidence. While
this issue will undoubtedly be litigated by pro se prisoners at the trial level,
that is not enough. Members of the bar are needed to confront the courts of
appeals in order for the issue to be taken seriously.
The last item I will discuss is my experience working with pro se civil
litigants on appeal. The past few years have seen a huge increase in the
amount of people filing civil appeals pro se. In 2004, for example, nonprisoner pro se litigants filed over 4,500 civil appeals in federal circuit
courts, accounting for 14 percent of the civil appeal docket. 33
The obstacles that pro se litigants face on appeal are similar to those
found at the trial court level. But on appeal, courts generally seem to
enforce more stringent rules for pleadings and exhibit far less leniency than
their trial court brethren. This sometimes produces multiple deficiency
letters and exasperation both from the party and the pro se clerk.
I routinely work with these litigants at Cockle Printing. Many of them
contact us after they have received a deficiency letter from the Supreme
Court Clerk’s Office. Just talking with them takes the right amount of
patience, tact, and at times, a delicate dose of forcefulness. The majority of
pro se people I encounter have sued big business or the government for
discrimination and, right or wrong, they feel that injustices have been
committed against them. They also understand, especially after I kindly tell
them, that their chances in the Supreme Court are next to nil. It is usually
then that they say, “I know, Shon, but I have got to take my chance
anyway.” To them, the Supreme Court is not only the place where the little
guy gets his chance. It is also, in the eyes of a pro se litigant, a place of
closure.
Solutions start with the courts. While many appellate courts—including
the Supreme Court—have added pro se resources for filing requirements to
their websites,34 few have added substantive tools necessary for pro se
litigants to succeed when presenting their claims.
Online tools can play a profound role in assisting pro se litigants. Cockle
has a whole page dedicated to the services it can provide to pro se

33. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS tbl.S-4 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2004/tables/s4.pdf (citing statistics for the twelve-month period ending
September 30, 2004); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND
FIGURES tbl.2.4 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialFactsAndFigures/2006/Table204.pdf (noting that, in 2004, all pro se appellants filed
over 25,000 appeals, accounting for 42.7 percent of the federal circuit court docket).
34. See Guide for Prospective Indigent Petitioners for Writs of Certiorari, U.S. SUPREME
COURT
(2010),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/guideforifpcases2010.pdf;
Memorandum to Those Intending to Prepare a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Booklet
Format and Pay the $300 Docket Fee, U.S. SUPREME COURT (2010),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/guidetofilingpaidcases2010.pdf.
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litigants, 35 and more importantly, provides two different sample petitions
that they can use as guides. 36 Courts too would be wise to place sample
motions and briefs on their website. (One word of caution for courts
thinking about adding sample briefs to their websites: make sure the briefs
you display meet all of the court’s filing requirements. Pro se filers will
follow those sample briefs sometimes to the letter and if the brief contains
mistakes so will their filings.)
Another way to assist pro se litigants in improving the quality of their
briefs is through online education. I believe that a series of online tutorials
could save court clerks a vast amount of time, and therefore increase the
efficiency of the courts. In deciding what type of information should be
provided in the tutorials, nothing should be taken for granted. The very first
tutorial should offer a summary of the appellate court’s role and explain
what types of claims are reviewable. For courts with discretionary review,
a video explaining the chances of success would be the best advice any
court could give to a would-be filer. Most pro se petitioners at the Supreme
Court level simply do not understand the odds against them and an
explanation from the Court of the success rate and types of claims that are
reviewed would deter some of these financially-strapped people—who have
little chance at review—from filing in the first place. Appellate courts
should also place forms and fact sheets on their websites, like forms for
simple motions such as extensions of time and fact sheets answering
common questions on filing requirements and the appellate process.
The bar can also help pro se parties on appeal by providing “unbundled”
services, which, in the case of appellate work, amounts to ghostwriting
briefs. While ghostwriting was once looked upon with disdain, in recent
times it has recently been viewed as an opportunity for the bar to provide
cost-effective legal guidance to those who cannot afford full
representation. 37 Indeed, even the American Bar Association has given its
imprimatur to ghostwriting by recently loosening the ethical rules
surrounding it. 38
Through my company, I have worked with attorneys that regularly
provide ghostwriting services to pro se parties on appeal. In every one of
the cases, the client could not afford the cost of full representation and it
was for that reason that they had contacted the attorney about unbundled
services. All of the clients seemed to appreciate the low-cost services we
35. Pro Se Briefs, COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., http://www.cocklelaw.com/
briefs/pro-se-briefs/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
36. Resources, COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., http://www.cocklelaw.com/resources/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
37. See Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable
Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct
Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1926 (1999) (praising law school clinics that provide
unbundled legal services and education to pro se litigants); Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting:
Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271
(2010).
38. See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446, at
1, 3–4 (2007).
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provided and in return for a reduced fee, they received an attorney-prepared
brief that they filed pro se—placing them in a much better position to
succeed on their claims.
From my experience, I can tell you that there is no rule of law, ethical
guideline, or policy preference that can place pro se litigants on equal
footing with those represented by counsel. Yet there are ways for us to
reduce the inherent inequities in our adversarial system for those unable to
afford the cost. Success for the pro se litigant is not unreachable. They
simply need some help. It is up to every part of the legal system to provide
that help so that justice may be acquirable for all.

